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WAR CRIMES, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
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ABSTRACT 
Political ideology aside, Canada has been seen as a global leader in the 
ever-developing international criminal law project. Yet, this position, 
and the legitimacy that accompanies it, is increasingly under threat. As 
Prosecutor Bensouda of the International Criminal Court begins her 
investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Afghanistan, it is possible Canadians will fall within the scope of 
potential indictments.  Herein lies the threat to Canada’s position. 
Canada was among the earliest states to adopt implementing legislation 
following its ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Yet, efforts to 
prosecute war criminals domestically have lagged. Should Canada 
prove unwilling or unable to pursue these criminals there will be no 
legitimate grounds to refuse prosecutions at the international level, per 
the principle of complementarity. These prosecutions – or potential 
lack thereof – threaten Canada’s role in the international criminal law 
project. While not ultimately conclusory, this paper aims to assess 
whether and how Canadian principles of liability can reflect the realities 
of international crimes, in full respect of the principle of 
complementarity, while staying true to the canons of domestic law. It 
is this analysis that will provide a basis for the normative and legal 
quadrangulation that needs to be done as Canada moves into a 
potentially precarious international legal position. 
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INTRODUCTION: CANADA, SOFT POWER, AND 
“LEGITMACY” UNDER THREAT 
Political ideology aside, Canada has been seen as a global leader in the ever-
developing international criminal law project. Yet, this position, and the 
legitimacy that accompanies it, is increasingly under threat. As Prosecutor 
Bensouda of the International Criminal Court [ICC] begins her investigation into 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan, it is possible Canadians 
will fall within the scope of potential indictments.1 Herein lies the threat to 
Canada’s position. Canada was among the earliest states to adopt implementing 
legislation following its ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC.2 Yet, efforts to 
prosecute war criminals domestically have lagged. Should Canada prove unwilling 
or unable to pursue these criminals there will be no legitimate grounds to refuse 
prosecutions at the international level, per the principle of complementarity. 
These prosecutions – or potential lack thereof – threaten Canada’s role in the 
international criminal law project. This paper is a response to this “threat.”   
The domestic adoption of international criminal law, however, is not simple; 
when transferring these modes to the domestic criminal system there are 
normative and legal gaps requiring quadrangulation. So long as the dichotomies 
between “international law” and “national law” on the one hand, and “criminal 
law” and “human rights law” on the other, continue to structure legal theory, 
doctrine, and practice, this quadrangulation remains evasive, and the need for it 
acute.  
Following the defining of key concepts and a brief exploration of this 
Canadian “legitimacy,” this paper proceeds as follows. The first section defines 
and critiques the modes of liability utilized by the ICC and the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.3 Understanding the 
 
1 See “Preliminary Examination, Focus: Alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 
Afghanistan since 1 May 2003”, International Criminal Court, online: <www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan/> 
[Preliminary Examination]. For information on potential Canadian culpability see: Craig Scott, Brief on the 
Investigation of Canadian Nationals for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Afghanistan, submitted to the 
International Criminal Court (26 November 2017) [Craig Scott, Afghanistan Brief].  
2 Fannie LaFontaine, “Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act on Trial: An Analysis of the 
Munyaneza Case” (2010) 8:1 J Intl Crim Justice 269 [“LaFontaine, CAHWCA On Trial”].  
3 While formally two separate institutions, the Tribunals have largely followed the same jurisprudential path 
with regards to modes of individual liability. Additionally, the two now operate under the guise of the same 
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jurisprudential and normative context that gave rise to these modes of liability is 
critical to understanding challenges with their domestic importation. The next 
section provides an overview of the relevant Canadian legislation: The Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. Following this, the paper begins the exercise 
of domestic extrapolation, directly comparing the international modes of liability 
with Canadian liability modes articulated in section 21 of the Criminal Code. The 
paper then turns to critiquing this attempted reconciliation. While outside 
Canadian jurisdiction, the legal reasoning in recent American counter-terrorism 
proceedings outlines the dangers that arise from the legal gymnastics involved in 
attempting the domestic importation of international modes of liability. Finally, 
the paper briefly discusses the potential challenges arising from the indictment of 
Canadians at the ICC. While not ultimately conclusory, this paper aims to assess 
whether and how Canadian principles of liability can reflect the realities of 
international crimes, in full respect of the principle of complementarity, while 
staying true to the canons of domestic law. It is this analysis that will provide a 
basis for the normative and legal quadrangulation that needs to be done as Canada 
moves into a potentially precarious international legal position. Canada’s global 
position has long been as a “soft-power” player; Canadian participation in the 
international criminal justice project was, and still is, emblematic of this role. It is 
the loss of the soft power that comes from this legitimacy that is potentially under 
threat. 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
This paper relies on a number of specific ontological terms, which may have 
varied meanings depending on context; of specific concern here are the terms 
“complementarity” and “normative quadrangulation.” For the purpose of clarity, 
the definitions for these terms through the duration of this paper are as follows:  
“Complementarity”: The principle of complementarity is the basis for the 
argument being presented here. A key concept in international law – specifically 
international criminal law – complementarity is the base jurisdictional principle 
 
institution, the Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). Thus, for the purposes of 
simplicity, they are considered to be one and the same for the purposes of this paper.  
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for the ICC.4 As outlined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, complementary ensures 
that domestic bodies have the first responsibility and right to process 
international crimes. The ICC, “may only exercise jurisdiction where national 
legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act but in reality are 
unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.”5 The principle is a 
contrast to universal jurisdiction; primary jurisdictional interest still rests with 
domestic institutions. The central question of this paper is whether the ICC can 
assume jurisdiction of Canadian individuals based on the principle of 
complementarity. In the event that Canadian domestic modes of liability do not 
permit the indictment or prosecution of these individuals domestically – as this 
paper will show they may not – then, and only then, per the principle of 
complementarity, may the ICC assume jurisdiction.6  
“Normative quadrangulation”: Essential to the exercise of determining 
whether or not the ICC can assume jurisdiction on the basis of the 
complementarity principle is the exercise of both normative and legal 
quadrangulation. These are different, though interlinked, concepts. The argument 
being put forth is that both are necessary in order for Canada to avoid any liability 
for its nationals based on complementarity. Legal quadrangulation in this context 
refers to the alignment of domestic and international modes of liability. Simply 
put: can the individual in question be indicted/liability be imputed in both the 
domestic and international contexts? The modes of liability in the international 
sphere, given the nature of the crimes the courts were designed to create, tend to 
be much broader in scope. If the individual cannot be held liable in a domestic 
court by the very structure of domestic laws and constitutional protections, then 
there may be a jurisdictional basis for the ICC based on complementarity. Thus, 
to avoid liability, legal quadrangulation is a vital first step. The second step, while 
not necessary in a complementarity framework per se, is the process of normative 
 
4 “The Principle of Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International 
Crimes” (4 September 2009), online: Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law 
<www.fichl.org/activities/the-principle-of-complementarity-and-the-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction-for-
core-international-crimes/>. For a more detailed discussion on the complementarity principle see, ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), “Informal Expert Paper: The Principles of Complementarity in Practice” 
2003, online: <www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/20bb4494-70f9-4698-8e30-
907f631453ed/281984/complementarity.pdf> [OTP Report].  
5 Ibid, OTP Report at 3. 
6 This is of course barring any voluntary extradition of Canadians for prosecution at the ICC.  
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quadrangulation. As will be seen throughout this paper, there is a perception 
element to the legitimacy of international law: for justice to be done it must be 
seen to be done. Even if the letter of domestic Canadian law is aligned with the 
ICC governing frameworks, if it appears that such laws or Canadian institutions 
allow individuals to evade potential culpability for war crimes, the threat to 
Canada remains immense. As noted in the introductory section, and as will be 
elaborated on below, the “threat” here is to Canada’s inherent legitimacy as a 
founder of the international criminal law project. Even if Canada is able to avoid 
turning over individuals for prosecution based on a strict interpretation of 
complementarity, if it is perceived as harboring war criminals this soft-power 
legitimacy is equally – if not more deeply – threatened.  
A NOTE ON LEGITMACY: CANADA’S GLOBAL POSITION AND 
THE ROME STATUTE 
While opinions on the current state of the Canadian geo-political position 
on the global stage are outside of the scope of this paper, the perception of 
Canada’s role in the development of the international criminal law project 
warrants description here. Understanding Canada’s historic position vis-à-vis 
international criminal law is critical to contextualizing the need for 
quadrangulation of Canada’s domestic system with its international obligations, 
and the impact of a failure of quadrangulation on Canada’s global position. 
Despite recent misgivings, Canada has long been seen as a “leader” in 
international criminal law; other countries “look to Canada for its recognized 
expertise in the intricacies of domestic implementation.”7  
Canada’s history of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
prosecutions pre-dates the proliferation of international criminal mechanisms in 
the 1990s. Due largely to a formal policy of inaction Canada was perceived as a 
haven for war criminals until the 1970s.8 In the 1980s the policy shifted: Canada 
 
7 William Schabas, “Foreword” in Fannie LaFontaine, Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes in Canadian Courts (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at ix [“LaFontaine, Prosecuting Genocide”].  
8 Valerie Oosterveld, “Canada and the Development of International Criminal Law: What Role for the 
Future?” (2018) 16 Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada in International Law at 150 and 
Beyond) at 2 [“Oosterveld”]. 
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addressed the issue through extradition.9 In response to Nazi doctor Joseph 
Mengele’s attempt to seek refuge in Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney ordered a 
federal inquiry on the subject.10 In its final reports, the Deschênes Commission 
recommended Parliament amend the Criminal Code to allow for the prosecution 
and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that immigration 
and citizenship laws be amended to allow for the expulsion of perpetrators.11 For 
the next two decades, Canada’s domestic attempts to enforce international law 
norms yielded some successes and a number of high profile failures.12 The result 
was a focus on administrative law to “deal with” those accused of such 
international crimes. 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal(s) for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR, respectively) shifted Canada’s focus to 
international fora. The drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
[“Rome Statute”] in the late 1990s and early 2000s established Canada’s position as 
a “recognized world leader” in the international criminal law project.13 A 
“prominent player” in the drafting of the Rome Statute, Canada continued to play 
a major role in the ICC after its entering into force.14 Canada also took a leading 
position in establishing and supporting international criminal institutions with 
jurisdiction over atrocities in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Cambodia.15  
 
9 Ibid at 2. See also, Federal Republic of Germany v Rauca, (1992) 38 OR (2d) 705 (HC), aff’d 41 OR (2d) 225 CA; 
Sol Littman, War Criminal on Trial: Rauca of Kaunas (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1998) at 19-20.  
10 Oosterveld, supra note 8 at 2.  
11 Oosterveld, ibid. See also, Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, Report, Part I (Public) (Ottawa: Supply 
and Services Canada, 1986) (Commissioner: Jules Deschênes) at 5-9. 
12 Of particular note is the case of Imre Finta, accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes due to his 
role in detaining and deporting to death 8,617 Jewish persons while serving as commander of the 
Gendarmerie in Hungary during WWII. After the war Finta immigrated to Canada and became a citizen in 
1956. Finta was acquitted on trial and appeal. The SCC judgment, while positive in confirming the 
retrospective criminalization of crimes against humanity and war crimes, interpreted the Criminal Code so as 
to impose additional elements of crime, creating a very high threshold for the proof of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The SCC also imposed as double burden on the prosecution to prove both the 
international offence and the Canadian domestic offence. As a result, the Finta decision essentially stopped 
the federal government from using criminal prosecution as a tool to address serious international crimes, 
forcing them to focus on administrative remedies. See R v Finta, [1994] 1 SCR 701 at 725-726 [“Finta”]. See 
also R v Pawlowski (1992), 13 CR (4th) 228 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)), aff’d (1993), 12 OR (3d) 709 (CA), leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, (1993), 15 OR (3d) xvi; R v Reistetter, (1990) OJ No 2100 (QL) (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)); 
R v Grujcic (1994), 25 WCB (2d) 49, [1994] OJ No 2280 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)). For reliance on administrative 
remedies see, e.g., Canada (Secretary of State) v Luitjens (1991) 46, FTR 267 (FCTD), aff’d 1992 CarswellNat 
1315 (FCA).  
13 Oosterveld, supra note 8 at 4-8.  
14 Ibid. Note that the Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.   
15 Ibid.  
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Under the Conservative Harper administration, Canada’s role with respect 
to international criminal justice institutions waned; the current Liberal 
administration, under Prime Minister Trudeau, has initiated yet another policy 
shift. In 2016 when three African states parties announced their intention to 
withdraw from the ICC, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion stated 
that “[w]e need more of the ICC, not less.”16 It is this role that Canada seems to 
continually assert– as global “gatekeeper” of international criminal justice 
institutions – that must guide any quadrangulation of the Canadian legal system 
and international legal norms. Should Canada wish to continue to position itself 
in this role, as it seemingly does, such quadrangulation is vital to stave of the 
threat of loss of legitimacy, mentioned at the outset of this paper.  
THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS:  RECONCILING HUMAN 
RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSITCE, AND INDIVIDUAL 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In order to contextualize the nature of this threat, it is necessary to discuss 
the driving factors behind both domestic and international criminal law. The gaps 
requiring quadrangulation exist for a reason: domestic and international criminal 
law are different tools, borne of different goals and serving different, often 
contradictory ends. As opposed to domestic criminal law, which is tasked solely 
with punishing individual wrongdoing for a specific criminal act, international 
criminal law is based on various legal traditions, each with a distinct purpose. The 
doctrines of international criminal liability, “being generalizations of the 
conditions in which punishment is proper, are primarily statements of normative 
import.”17 Domestic Canadian criminal law frameworks and institutions, which 
are innately based in the rule of law, have a different foundation than international 
criminal law and legal institutions, which have been developed within the UN 
 
16 Ibid. See also Canada, “Statement by the Hon. Stéphane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs 
Canada, Fifteenth Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute” (16 November 2016) at 2 -3, online: 
<asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/GenDeba/ICC-ASP15-GenDebaCANADA-ENG-FRA.pdf>.  
17 Allyson Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2005) 93 Cal L Rev 75 at 79 
[“Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations”], citing Stanford H Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine” (1985) 73:2 Calif L Rev 323 at 326.  
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paradigm, centering on respect for human dignity, international human rights law, 
and humanitarian law.18 Thus, a critical analysis of the moral commitments that 
guide this “importation” is necessary to understanding the emergence of these 
modes and potential challenges of their domestic use. 
International criminal law draws from three legal traditions: domestic 
criminal law, human rights law, and transitional justice. These traditions are not 
always complimentary and, in many ways, are deeply at odds.19  
Domestic criminal law focuses on individual wrongdoing as a necessary 
prerequisite to the imposition of criminal punishment. This “principle of personal 
culpability” has been understood to pertain to international criminal law as well.20 
The specific procedural and substantive criminal law doctrines, and the culpability 
principle they help defend, distance the liberal trial from the “show trials” of 
Tokyo and Nuremburg, preventing the basing of guilt on association alone.21  
Human rights law, however, is not concerned with the deprivation of 
personal liberty; institutions enforcing international human rights rarely need to 
justify such an assertion of power.22 As a victim-centered enterprise, human rights 
law actively refrains from making determinations of individual responsibility for 
wrongdoing; the nation-state as a whole, not individual members, is liable for 
violations of human rights.23 While the basic assumption of international law 
remains nulla poena sine culpa – the principle of personal culpability; that no person 
may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not 
personally engaged – this is pursued in light of broader objectives of human rights 
law.24 Importing the interpretive techniques and analytical modes drawn from a 
 
18 Terje Einarsen & Joseph Rikhof, A Theory of Punishable Participation in Universal Crimes (Brussels: Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2018) [Einarsen and Rikhof]; See also Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-A, 
Judgment (15 July 1999) at 40 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) [Tadić Judgment]. 
19 Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations, supra note 17 at 81-82.  
20 See Tadić Judgment, supra note 18. 
21 Danner and Martinez, supra note 17 at 83. 
22 Ibid at 86.  
23 Ibid; see also Silvia Borelli, “State Responsibility in International Law”, Oxford Bibliographies (27 June 2017), 
online: <www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0031.xml>.  
24 Einarsen and Rikhof, supra note 18, citing Tadić Judgment, supra note 18.  
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human rights paradigm to a system designed to punish individuals for previously 
articulated crimes, poses dangers for the integrity of the criminal system.25  
In the transitional justice context, the criminal trial becomes a tool aimed 
towards a broader political goal; it is a mechanism used to enforce the political 
transition from one regime to another.26 The model fixes liability on key leaders 
to exonerate society at large. As former ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese has 
explained, “[T]rials establish individual responsibility over collective assignation 
of guilt…victims are prepared to be reconciled with their erstwhile tormentors, 
because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes.”27 Individual 
accountability is thus a means to an end, promoting reconciliation by “breaking 
the collective cycle of guilt that frequently fuels conflicts that result in mass 
atrocity.”28 
It is the combination of these three legal traditions which give rise to the 
modes of liability used by the international courts. Their use in international 
courts is justified by the unique goals of these institutions and the need to assign 
individual liability for collective crimes; the end seemingly justifies the means. The 
enhanced accountability that these theories enable however – the ability to 
attribute individual liability for collective crimes, in various circumstances – 
comes at the expense of key criminal law principles. While legitimate in the 
international context their importation into the domestic context is devoid of 
these traditions and, thus, these justifications.  
“THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS”: JCES, CO-PERPETRATION, 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATOINAL MODES OF 
LIABILITY 
Of primary importance to this quadrangulation experiment are the “modes 
of liability” [herein, “modes”] utilized by the international criminal justice 
institutions to confer liability on an accused. Contemporary international law is 
 
25 Ibid at 101.  
26 Ibid at 90.  
27 Antonio Cassese, “Reflections on International Criminal Justice” (1998) 6:1 Mod L Rev 1 at 6.  
28 Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations, supra note 17 at 93. 
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largely concerned with holding individual defendants responsible for mass 
atrocities. Because the crimes usually involve the concerted efforts of many 
individuals, allocating responsibility among them is critical to individual criminal 
proceedings.29 
Two liability doctrines have emerged from the jurisprudence of the principle 
organs of international criminal law: the ICTY/ICTR, and the ICC. These liability 
doctrines – joint criminal enterprise (“JCEs”) and command responsibility, 
respectively – play a central role in the allocation of guilt in international criminal 
law. What is critical to understand is that both doctrines operate squarely within 
the principle of individual culpability: both doctrines seek the attribution and 
calibration of individual responsibility for mass atrocities while simultaneously 
upholding the idea that an individual may be punished only for conduct for which 
she or he is personally responsible.30 As will be discussed in subsequent sections, 
international criminal law includes the most serious consequences of domestic 
criminal proceedings – the right to deprive individuals of their liberty – but lacks 
the security provided by a clearly articulated and time-tested criminal code.31 
The ICTY, the ICTR, and the Principle of Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Perhaps the more controversial of the two identified modes, the JCE 
doctrine was first articulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadić. While JCE liability is not explicitly described in the ICTY/ICTR Statutes, 
the doctrine has been confirmed through case law and the judges have deemed it 
implicitly included in the language of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.32 Generally, 
under this mode, an individual may be criminally responsible as co-perpetrator 
for crimes committed in furtherance of a common purpose if it is known to him 
or her that his or her assistance is supporting the crimes of the broader JCE, and 
he or she “shares [the JCE’s] intent.”33  
 
29 Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations, ibid at 77. See also Tadić Judgment, supra note 18 at 191.  
30 Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations, ibid at 78.  
31 Ibid at 98.  
32 Ibid, at 103, referring to Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljević, Case No IT-98-32-A, Judgment (25 February 2004), 
paras 94-101 [Vasiljević Judgment].  
33 Catherine Gibson, “Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine in the ICTY: A 
Comparison of Individual Liability for Group Conduct in International and Domestic Law” (2008) 18:2 
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As articulated in the Tadić appeal, JCE refers to three forms of liability, aptly 
referred to as JCE (I), (II), and (III). In all three, the prosecution must show: (1) 
“a plurality of persons”; (2) “[t]he existence of a common plan, design, or purpose 
which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the 
[ICTY] Statute;” and (3) “[p]articipation of the accused in the common design.”34 
Thus, the requirements of JCE liability may be divided into requirements for the 
group (plurality of persons with a common purpose) and requirements for the 
individual (participation and the requisite mens rea).35 The requirements for the 
group are minimal. The “plurality of persons” requirement may be satisfied when 
the prosecution proves that the group “included the leaders of political bodies, 
the army, and the police who held power [in a given area]”; there is no need to 
establish an organized “military, political, or administrative structure.”36 The 
second requirement – the existence of a common purpose – may be established 
even if that purpose was not arranged prior to the conduct of the crime; the 
common purpose “may materialize extemporaneously.”37 It is with individual 
participation – particularly in establishing requisite mens rea discussed below – on 
which individual culpability seems to turn. Participation must be proven in all 
three forms.38 This requires a minimal contribution to the group in question; once 
an individual in a JCE shares the intent of the group, and “assists” or contributes 
to the carrying-out of the enterprise’s common purpose, the relatively low 
threshold of contribution is met .39 The physical presence of the accused when 
the crime is committed is irrelevant to JCE liability.  
Given the breadth of these actus reus requirements, findings of individual 
liability turn largely on establishing the requisite mens rea. The requisite mens rea 
may be met in one of three ways, each constituting a different form of JCE 
liability:40  
 
Duke J Comp & Intl L 521 at 524 [“Gibson”], referring to: Prosecutor v Kvočka, Case No IT-98-30/A-A, 
Judgment (28 February 2005) at 90 [“Kvočka Judgment”].  
34 Gibson, ibid, at 524; referring to Tadić Judgment, supra note 18 at 227.  
35 Gibson, ibid at 524. 
36 Gibson, ibid at 524, referring to Vasiljević Judgment, supra note 32 at 100; Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Case 
No IT-97-24-A, Judgment (22 March 2006) at 69.  
37 Gibson, ibid at 525, referring to Vasiljević Judgment, supra note 32 at 100.  
38 Gibson, Ibid.  
39 Gibson, Ibid, referring to Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case No IT-97-35-A, Judgment (17 September 2003) at 81.  
40 Gibson, Ibid at 526.  
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JCE I: In the most basic form of JCE liability, the prosecution must prove 
that the perpetrator acted with “the intent to perpetrate a certain crime.” What 
matters is not whether the person who carried out the actus reus of a particular 
crime is a member of the JCE, but whether the crime in question forms part of 
the common purpose. An individual defendant may be held responsible pursuant 
to JCE I if she or he participates in that enterprise with a plurality of persons and 
has the specific intent to achieve a common purpose that violates the ICTY 
statute.41  
JCE II: In the “systemic” form of JCE liability, the requisite mens rea is 
established where an individual holds a position of authority in a military or 
administrative unit and participates in some way in an organized system of 
criminality perpetrated by that unit. As mens rea must be assessed in relation to the 
knowledge of a particular accused, the accused must have personal knowledge of 
the system of criminality and intend to further this system – the crimes must be 
a natural and foreseeable consequence to him/her of his/her participation in the 
system.42   
JCE III: The most controversial form of JCE liability, “extended liability,” 
is established where an individual “manifests a criminal intention to participate in 
a common criminal design” and “criminal acts other than those envisaged in the 
common criminal design are likely to be committed by other participants in the 
common design.”43 Two findings of mens rea are thus required: (1) the accused 
must have the intention to participate in and contribute to the common criminal 
purpose; and (2) the accused must also know that such a crime might be 
perpetrated by a member of the group, and willingly take the risk that the crime 
might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.44 Thus, JCE 
III allows the prosecution to impute criminal liability to individuals for crimes 
they neither committed nor knew were taking place.45 Where both “intent” and 
“knowledge” appear to be required with regard to the first two forms, they are 
 
41 Gibson, ibid at 526-527. See also Prosecutor v Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-, Judgment (3 April 2007) 
at 410 [“Brđanin Case”].  
42 Gibson, ibid at 527.  
43 Tadić Judgment, supra note 18 at 204, 206.  
44 Gibson, supra note 33 at 528, referring to Kovcka Judgment, supra note 18 at 83.  
45 Gibson, ibid. 
Vol. 28 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 119 
 
not required here: the requisite mens rea is lowered to a standard akin to 
recklessness.46 
In theory, the JCE doctrine allows for all crimes committed against a 
particular group within an entire region over a period of years to be attributed to 
a defendant if she or he was part of a group that intended to perpetrate these 
crimes.47 In practice, this endows international prosecutors with significant 
discretion to determine the scope of wrongdoing that will be attributed to any 
single defendant. Depending on how broadly prosecutors describe the criminal 
goal of a given enterprise, or how loosely foreseeability is construed, and 
individual’s liability can vary.48 
Of note here is the fact that, per the definition in Tadić, JCE liability is not 
“a form of accomplice liability, but as a form of commission” [sic]. If an individual 
“knows that his assistance is supporting the crimes of a group of persons involved 
in a [JCE] and shares that intent, he may be found criminally responsible for the 
crimes committed in furtherance of that common purpose as a co-perpetrator.”49 
This recognition of group criminality was deemed essential for the enforcement 
of international law because the nature of these international crimes lends to 
perpetration by a group, not individual criminality. Any meaningful 
criminalization of contributions to such groups must take into account the 
culpability of individual participants as well as the “increased social endangerment” 
of collective criminal enterprises.50  On the other hand, concerns of fairness and 
legitimacy have required international legal bodies to prevent JCE [liability] from 
evolving into a doctrine of “guilt by association.”51 It is the danger posed in 
reconciling these opposing positions – in potentially limiting the latter to facilitate 
the former – that arises in the domestic importation of the JCE mode. 
 
46 Stefano Manacorda & Chantal Meloni, “Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring 
Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?” (2011) 9:1 J Intl Crim Justice 159 at 162 
[“Manacorda and Meloni”].  
47 Danner and Martinez, Guilty Associations, supra note 17 at 98. 
48 Ibid at 135.  
49 Gibson, supra note 33 at 523-524. 
50 Einarsen and Rikhof, supra note 18 at 43. 
51 Gibson, supra note 33 at 522-523.  
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The ICC: Command Responsibility and Direct/Indirect Co-Perpetration 
In its earliest decisions, the ICC has rejected the JCE approach, developing 
a jurisprudential alternative to attribute individual responsibility vis-à-vis the joint 
commission of crimes. In interpreting Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute – the 
provision delineating the modes of individual liability – the judges of the ICC 
have developed the “co-perpetration” model, based on the concept of “control 
over the crime.”52 Pursuant to this model, principals are distinguished from 
accessories according to their “control over the crime.”53 In contrast to the 
ICTY/ICTR, the ICC has taken a restrictive approach in determining what 
constitutes principal liability. The Pre-Trial Chamber [“PTC”] has determined 
that “committing”, per article 25(3)(a), constitutes principle liability, while other 
forms of liability under Article 25(3)(b-d) amount to accessorial liability.54 
In applying the co-perpetration model based on command theory, the ICC 
has developed four modes of principal responsibility: (1) direct perpetration, (2) 
co-perpetration, (3) indirect perpetration, and (4) indirect co-perpetration. 
Direct perpetration: Direct perpetration takes place when an individual 
physically carries out the objective elements of a crime and has the mental state 
required by article 30(1) of the Rome Statute and the crime in question.55 Direct 
perpetration is rare in relation to Rome Statute crimes, given their wide-scale 
nature.56  
 
52 Manacorda and Meloni, supra note 46 at 164, referring to The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No 
ICC-01/04-01/06-88-Corr, Decision on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber I (24 
February 2006). It bears noting here that “control over the crime” has been codified as command theory. 
The modes of liability discussed in this section are derived from command theory as a basis for individual 
criminal liability. When referred to in the body of this work, command theory is an overarching theory of 
liability, not a basis for individual principal responsibility.    
53 Sofia Lord, Joint Criminal Enterprise and the International Criminal Court: A Comparison between Joint 
Criminal Enterprise and the Modes of Liability in Joint Commission in Crime under the Rome Statute; Can 
the International Criminal Court Apply Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Mode of Liability? (International 
Criminal Law Thesis, Stockholm University Faculty of Law, 2013) [unpublished][“Lord”].  
54 Lord, ibid at 37-38, referring to The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04-01-06-803, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I (29 January 2007) [“Lubanga Confirmation of 
Charges”]. 
55 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, ibid at para 332. See also Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No ICC-01/04-
01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I (30 September 2008), [“Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Decision”].  
56 Lord, supra note 53 at 38.  
Vol. 28 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 121 
 
Co-perpetration: Per the Rome Statute, this refers to crimes committed jointly 
with another. The PTC has analyzed co-perpetration in the context of the 
“control over the crime theory”, noting principal liability is “ not limited to those 
who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include[s] 
those who… control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether 
and how the offence will be committed.”57 This is the closest ICC analogue to 
JCE liability, though it does not seem to extend to JCE III.58 
Indirect perpetration: Defined as committing a crime through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible,59 
indirect perpetration requires either that the defendant use a subordinate 
individual who is used as an instrument to commit the crime, or that the 
defendant have authority over a hierarchical and rule-governed organization 
whose members carry out the crimes under their command. When assessed with 
regard to “control theory”, the requisite mens rea is met where the individual has 
control of the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence.60 
Ordinarily this requires that the accused control an organization, such as the 
military or government administration.61 The accused must be aware of the 
character of their organization, their authority within the organization, and the 
factual circumstances enabling near automatic compliance with their orders.62 
Indirect co-perpetration: A construct of the PTC, indirect co-perpetration 
requires the combined objective and subjective elements of co-perpetration based 
on joint control and indirect perpetration. It is the mode of liability used when 
command of various groups, which could not or would not be integrated into a 
single organization and therefore are not subject to the same chain of command, 
are concerned.63  
 
57 Lord, ibid at 40, referring to Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 54 at para 330.  
58 Lord, ibid at 40. See also Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta, International Criminal Law, 3rd Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 3.  
59 Lord, ibid at 38. 
60 Lord, ibid at 42, referring to Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 54 at para 332.  
61 Lord, ibid at 43. 
62 Lord, ibid. See also Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision, supra note 55 at para 515.  
63 See, e.g., Lord, ibid at 45. In the warrant for his arrest, President Al Bashir of Sudan is named as an 
“indirect co-perpetrator”, bearing criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed against members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in Darfur. His responsibility 
stems from his role in coordinating the design and implementing the common criminal plan through his 
position as a director of a branch of the apparatus of the Sudanese state. See, The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, 
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While on its face narrower in scope than the JCE mode of liability, the 
doctrine of command theory and the principles of direct and indirect 
perpetration/co-perpetration invite many of the same dangers. While the JCE 
doctrine creates liability for participation in joint endeavors, Article 25 instead 
establishes liability for individuals who “contribute” to a group acting with a 
common purpose. The Rome Statute thus criminalizes individual commission, but 
also, explicitly, joint commission and commission through another person, 
regardless of whether that person is criminally responsible.64 Just as JCE provides 
vicarious liability for members who conspire to pursue collective criminal action, 
Article 25(3)(d) appears to provide derivative liability for accomplices.65 
Accomplice liability is, by definition, derivative, as it presupposes the existence of 
a primary offence. However, in a narrow interpretation of Article 25(3)(d), there 
need not be a “primary offence” of direct participation in a group crime, only 
derivative liability for contributing as an outside accomplice. The only solution to 
this problem, as pointed out by Professor Jens David Ohlin, is to find this primary 
offence in the Article 25(3)(a) notion of committing an offence “jointly with 
another.” This would require equating committing a crime “jointly with another” 
as being equivalent to “a crime committed by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose”; bearing striking similarity to the JCE model.66  
CO-PERPETRATION AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATOIN: THE 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES ACT 
International criminal tribunals, particularly the ICC, rely however on the 
domestic importation of these justifications. One of the pre-eminent challenges 
of the ICC’s work is thus ensuring states have the capacity to act as the primary 
 
Case No ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber (04 March 
2009), at paras 209-223. Al Bashir is still not under arrest, thus there has been no decision on the 
confirmation of charges.   
64 Fannie LaFontaine, “Parties to Offences under the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act: An Analysis of Principal Liability and Complicity” (2009) 50:3-4 C de D 967 [“LaFontaine, Principal 
Liability Analysis”]. 
65 Jens David Ohlin, “Joint Criminal Confusion” (2009) 12:3 New Crim L Rev 406 at 408 [“Ohlin, 
Confusion”], referring to Kai Ambos, Amicus Brief for Pre-Trial Chamber on Joint Criminal Enterprise in Criminal 
Investigation Against Kaing, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (27 October 2008) at 15.  
66 Ohlin, Confusion, ibid at 415-416.  
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fora for such prosecutions.67 The most significant obstacle faced by national 
jurisdictions in this endeavour is situating their regimes within the broader 
international criminal law system, which requires translating international law 
norms into domestic ones.68 The normative reconciliation outlined at the outset 
of this paper – of international norms with domestic rights – is thus vital to the 
international criminal law project. 
As noted above, Canada was quick to adopt implementing legislation 
following its ratification of the Rome Statute.69 What is noteworthy, however, is 
not the speed with which Canada ratified such legislation, but, rather, the 
legislation’s unique structure. Canada’s approach diverges from that of other 
states parties, as it does not adopt the Rome Statute outright. Rather, the Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act  [CAHWCA] relies on the Rome Statute as an 
“interpretive guide” for customary international law.70 The definitions of offences 
in the CAHWCA refer exclusively to international law, while available defences 
are those of both Canadian law and international law, and the modes of liability 
are exclusively of domestic Canadian origin.71 It is this explicit reliance on 
international law as a driving force for domestic Canadian legal regimes that 
exacerbates the potential threat to Canadian legitimacy should Canada be found 
unable or unwilling to prosecute alleged perpetrators. Canada has chosen to 
construct legal institutions based on these international frameworks, yet, it may 
be determined that the operability of these frameworks in Canada does not meet 
international standards, enabling the ICC to assume jurisdiction on the basis of 
complementarity. This seems to be a risk that the drafters of the legislation 
overlooked: in its reliance on the Rome Statute as an interpretive guide for the 
domestic implementation of customary international law, the CAHWCA does 
not instruct courts on the resolution of conflicts between the two regimes.  
 
67 Robert J Currie, “Fannie LaFontaine, Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in 
Canadian Courts”, Book Review, (2013) 11:5 J Intl Crim Justice 1166 at 1167.  
68 LaFontaine, Prosecuting Genocide, supra note 7 at 1-11. 
69 LaFontaine, CAHWCA On Trial, supra note 2 at 269. 
70 Andrew Halpenny, “Prosecuting Genocide: Crimes Against Humanity and Wary Crimes in Canadian 
Courts”, Book Review of Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Canadian Courts by 
Fannie LaFontaine, (2012) 50 Can YB Intl L 640 at 643 [“Halpenny”]. 
71 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 974.  
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In drawing this normative separation, and failing to implement a mechanism 
for conflict resolution, the CAHWCA invites normative confusion.72 While the 
liability modes of international law are based on the collective nature of 
international crimes, the CAHWCA rests largely on classic criminal law categories 
“built on a ‘mononuclear’ paradigm (one authour, one fact, one victim).” Such 
categories therefore seem irreconcilable with the ‘collective’ criminality” of 
international crimes.73 Canadian modes of participation in offences may be found 
to be maladapted or in need of a different interpretation when applied to 
international crimes.74 In particular, although various modes of commission 
recognized in international criminal law articulate a broad concept of complicity, 
the reliance on the mononuclear paradigm means that individuals in Canada “will 
not be held liable for crimes committed by a group simply because they are 
associated with that group or because they passively acquiesced to the group’s 
criminal purpose.”75 
Given the central purpose of this paper –to assess whether and how 
Canadian principles of liability can reflect the realities of international crimes, in 
full respect of the principle of complementarity, while staying true to the canons 
of domestic law – the modes of liability employed by the CAHWCA are of 
primary interest here. Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the CAHWCA outline the modes 
of liability used by the statute, stating that “[e]very person is guilty of an indictable 
offence who commits” one of the core crimes.76 It specifically adds, at paragraph 
 
72 Halpenny, supra note 70 at 643. This is in contrast to the war crimes legislation of other like countries. See, 
e.g., New Zealand’s International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, (NZ), 2000/26, s 12, which 
incorporates art 25(3) of the Rome Statute and also clarifies that in the event of a conflict with New Zealand 
law (particularly art 66 of the Crimes Act, 1961 (NZ), 1961/43, which provides for modes of criminal 
liability), art 25(3) of the Rome Statute will prevail.  
73 Stefano Manacorda, “Foreword to the Symposium: The Principles of Individual Criminal Responsibility: A 
Conceptual Framework” (2007) 5:4 J Intl Crim Justice 913 at 913, referenced in LaFontaine, Principal Liability 
Analysis, supra note 63 at 970. 
74 The Supreme Court recognized the “analysis of international jurisprudence in the interpretation of 
domestic principles of liability” may be of crucial importance in light of this. See Mugesera v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para 134 [Mugesera].  
75 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola]. 
76 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24, assented to 29 June 2000, at ss 4(1) and 6(1) 
[sic]. As noted by LaFontaine, interestingly, the marginal note at ss 4(1.1) and 6(1.1) of the CAHWCA, reads 
differently in English than it does in French. In English it reads “[c]onspiracy, attempt, etc.”, while in French it 
reads: “[p]unition de la tentative, de la complicité, etc.” [emphasis added]. It is puzzling that “conspiracy” has 
been rendered in French as “complicité” despite the fact that the Criminal Code generally uses the translation 
“complot”. Discussions were held on this marginal note in the debates before the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, without however taking issue on this matter. See: Canada, House of 
Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Crimes Against Humanity” 
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1.1, that “[e]very person who conspires or attempts to commit, is an accessory 
after the fact in relation to, or counsels in relation to, an offence referred to in 
subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence.”77 As will be discussed in a 
subsequent section, the particular language of these modes, when reconciled with 
the Canadian Criminal Code [“Code”] provisions on liability, provide a basis for the 
exercise of reconciliation with international modes of liability. The following 
sections aim to begin this reconciliation.  
A COMPARISON OF THE “COMMON PURPOSE DOCTRINE”, 
JCES ANDD INDIRECT CO-PERPETRATOIN THROUGH THE 
LENS OF SECTION 21 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 
As Canada embraces a dualist paradigm of international law – reflected in 
the decision not to necessarily import the Rome Statute outright but rather to 
import particular provisions for the purpose of incorporation into the domestic 
context – all international law must be reconciled with existing domestic 
paradigms to be of force and effect. The Canadian Criminal Code [“Code”] details 
the modes of liability of Canadian domestic law. Section 21 of the Code outlines 
four ways in which a person can be criminally liable for an act: (1) as a principal, 
(2) as an aider, (3) as an abettor, or (4) as an individual with a “common intention” 
to commit an offence.78 The purpose of the section is “to make the difference 
between aiding and abetting and personally committing an offence legally 
irrelevant.” It is thus unnecessary for the purposes of indictment whether the 
person is charged as a principal or as a party.79 However, section 21 effectively 
codifies the common law distinction between principal and secondary liability; a 
distinction used primarily for sentencing purposes.80 It is with this particular 
 




78 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 21(1) & 21(2). 
79 R v Thatcher, [1987] 1 SCR 652, 1987 CanLII 53 at para 68, [Thatcher] per Dickson CJC: “This provision (s. 
21) is designed to make the difference between aiding and abetting and personally committing an offence 
legally irrelevant.”  
80 R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32 at para 51 [Pickton] per LeBel J: “Generally speaking, there are two forms of 
liability for Criminal Code offences, primary or principal liability (actually or personally committing the 
offence), and secondary liability (also known as party liability), both codified in s. 21 of the Criminal Code. 
Whether an accused is found guilty either as a principal offender or as a party to the offence, the result is the 
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understanding of liability – where there is no formal distinction required between 
“principal” and “party” liability – that the international modes must be reconciled.  
Given the breadth of modes of liability covered by section 21 of the Code, 
and the confluence of principal and party liability, on its face it would seem that 
reconciliation between domestic and international regimes is possible. While not 
untrue, this is an over-simplification: reconciliation may be possible, but it is not 
simple. The Supreme Court has recognized the challenges in this reconciliation.81 
Of note here is how the court has gone about this exercise: the intentional course 
of action taken by the court has been to analyze international jurisprudence in the 
interpretation of domestic principles of liability – not vice versa. The international 
is thus to inform the domestic, not shape it outright.   
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s analysis in determining the 
individual criminal liability of Léon Mugesera. Mugesera, a hard-line Hutu 
political party member gave a speech at a meeting of the party in Rwanda. The 
contents of this speech led Rwandan authorities to issue a warrant for his arrest. 
He subsequently fled to Canada. In 1995 the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration commenced proceedings under subsections 27(1) and 19(1) of the 
Immigration Act to deport Mugesera on the basis that by delivering his speech he 
had incited murder, genocide, and hatred, and committed a crime against 
humanity. After appeals at numerous levels, the crux of the Supreme Court case 
turned on whether or not Mugesera had committed the aforementioned crimes 
in the commission of this speech. At paragraph 134 of the judgment, in 
establishing Mugesera’s personal criminal liability, the Court relied on 
international jurisprudence to contextualize domestic modes of liability, 
reasoning:  
The statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR […] do not use the word 
“counselling” […] This Court found in Sharpe … that 
counselling refers to active inducement or encouragement from 
an objective point of view. The ICTR has found that instigation 
“involves prompting another to commit an offence”: … The 
 
same in law: the accused will be convicted of the substantive offence.  It is for this reason that it is 
sometimes said that it is “a matter of indifference” at law whether an accused personally committed a crime, 
or alternatively, aided and/or abetted another to commit the offence.” 
81 See Mugesera, supra note 74 at para 134.  
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two terms are clearly related. As a result, we may look to the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR […] in determining 
whether counselling an offence that is not committed will be 
sufficient to satisfy the initial criminal act requirement for a 
crime against humanity under s. 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code.82 
The Court justified its reliance on international case law by the similarity in 
the interpretation given to the term “counselling” in the two decisions (R v Sharpe 
and The Prosecutor v Akayesu).83 In determining the applicability of international 
modes of liability one must therefore consider whether they are reconcilable with 
the modes of liability outlined in the CAHWCA, the Criminal Code, and Canadian 
jurisprudence – as opposed to attempting to make these “fit” within international 
paradigms. The basis for normative reconciliation must start with the domestic 
context and stem outwards.  As such, the three forms of perpetration that are 
controversial in terms of modes of liability are assessed in this section: co-
perpetration, perpetration through another person, and aiding and abetting/the 
common purpose doctrine.84 
Co-Perpetration 
Both the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals imbue 
individual liability for co-perpetration: through article 25(3) and the JCE doctrine, 
respectively. While the application of the JCE doctrine to co-perpetration has 
been explained in great detail, the reasoning of the ICC’s PTC in its application 
of article 25(3) warrants further elaboration.  
With respect to co-perpetration, the ICC PTC established an intricate test 
aimed at determining whether the alleged co-perpetrator had sufficient control over 
the offence.85 Control is established where objective elements were established, 
including: (1) the existence of a plan or agreement between two or more persons 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 972, referring to R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45, at para 56; 
The Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No.ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) (ICTR Trial Chamber), at para 
482.  
84 Given its relatively straightforward nature, liability for individual commission has not been discussed here. 
For more information on the subject see LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, ibid at 973-976.  
85 This is to maintain adherence to the “control of the crime” theory adopted by the Court. See Lubanga 
Confirmation of Charges, supra note 54 at para. 342-367. See also LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, ibid at 
977.  
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and, (2) an essential contribution by each co-perpetrator to the realization of the 
offence. Subjective elements are also required, including: (1) that the suspect have 
the requisite mens rea for the crime at issue, (2) that the suspect and other co-
perpetrators share in the knowledge that the crime may result from the 
implementation of their common plan, and (3) that the suspect knew of the 
factual circumstances allowing him to exercise joint control over the commission 
of the crime.86 The requirements are thus similar to those required to establish 
liability per JCE I: (1) the participation in an enterprise with a plurality of persons, 
(2) with the specific intent to achieve a common criminal purpose pursuant to 
the statute.87  
Subsection 21(1)(a) of the Code, despite its use of the singular, does not 
exclude a plurality of perpetrators; the Code is thus prima facie reconcilable with the 
ICC’s co-perpetration model. However, analogies between the domestic and 
international contexts end here. In Canadian law it is also essential that the 
accused actually committed an essential element of the crime.88 Herein lies the 
fundamental difference between international and domestic liability for “co-
perpetratorship”: domestically, such liability stems from the individual’s 
performance of the actus reus, not the significance of their action to the common 
plan.89 By requiring the physical commission of an element of the crime, Canadian 
“co-perpetratorship” is far narrower in scope than its international counterparts.  
Perpetration Through Another Person 
The commission of a crime “through another person” covered through 
article 25 of the Rome Statute and the JCE model is akin to the Canadian 
jurisprudential concept of “innocent agency.”90 In situations of “innocent 
 
86 Ibid.  
87 See Brđanin Case, supra note 41. 
88 LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 977-978.  
89 LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, ibid at 978. 
90 Note that, as LaFontaine recognizes, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
further confirmed that co-perpetratorship through a guilty or innocent agent is contemplated by the Statute: 
“basing a person’s criminal responsibility on the joint commission of a crime through one or more persons is therefore a 
mode of liability ‘in accordance with the Statute’” [emphasis added]. See Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-17, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, at para 491. This 
amounts to the creation of an additional mode of principal liability under article 25(3) of the Rome Statute. 
For the concept of innocent agency in Canada see R v Berryman, [1990] 78 CR (3d) 76, 57 CCC (3d) 275 
BCCA at paras 381-387. 
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agency”, the perpetrator uses a person who lacks the requisite mens rea to be 
convicted of the offence to commit the criminal act. The perpetrator is thus 
principally liable for the crimes despite not personally committing any material 
element of the offence.91 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute, however, does not limit itself to perpetration 
through an innocent agent; it specifies that commission through another person 
occurs, “regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.” Thus, 
the ICC recognizes perpetration through a “guilty agent”, imbuing liability for the 
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” based on control theory.92  
While highly pertinent to ICC prosecutions, considering the absence of 
“guilty agent” liability of under Canadian law, principal liability “will be 
inapplicable for a wide range of persons responsible for the ‘most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole’.”93 Should this hold true, 
and such participants to international offences not be found liable by other 
applicable principles, they would be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction.94  
Aiding, Abetting, and the Common Purpose Doctrine 
Accomplice liability is an essential tool in the imputing of liability on 
numerous individual who contribute to the commission of international crimes, 
given their collective nature. The CAHWCA, however, does not explicitly include 
important forms of participation provided for at section 21 of the Criminal Code, 
namely aiding, abetting, and liability stemming from a “common intention” to 
commit an offence.95 However, considered in conjunction with subsection 34(2) 
of the Interpretation Act, all modes of liability outlined in section 21 of the Code can 
 
91 Ibid. See also LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 978.  
92 Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision, supra note 55 at para 497. See also LaFontaine, Principal Liability 
Analysis, ibid at 978-979. 
93 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, ibid at 980, referring to Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 
July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [“Rome Statute”].  
94 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, ibid at 981. 
95 Ibid. As LaFontaine notes, this is in stark contrast with the repealed s 7 (3.77) of the Criminal Code, which 
has since been replaced by the CAHWCA, which was much more explicit. Per s 7 (3.77): “In the definitions 
‘crime against humanity’ and ‘war crime’ in subsection (3.76), ‘act or omission’ includes, for greater certainty, 
attempting or conspiring to commit, counseling any person to commit, aiding or abetting any person in the 
commission of, or being an accessory after the fact in relation to, an act or omission.”  
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be said to apply to offences prosecuted under the CAHWCA.96 Thus, their 
analysis is warranted.  
There has been a tendency in international criminal law to consider parties 
as having a “lower degree of criminal responsibility” than principals.97 As noted 
above, per the jurisprudential interpretation of section 21 of the Code, principal 
and secondary parties in Canada are charged with the same offence; the trial judge 
retains discretion to sentence in accordance with individual culpability.98 The 
particularities of material and mental elements for each crime, causality 
requirements, and defences, mean the scope of principal liability is narrower in 
Canada than in international criminal law. Thus, party liability represents “the 
limits of Canadian law” regarding liability for international crimes that must be 
reconciled with complementarity.99  
There is relative consistency between the applicable principles determining 
party liability in domestic and international criminal law. Neither requires a causal 
connection between the individual and the crime to establish actus reus.100 As 
regards the requisite mens rea, however, there is a key distinction between the 
regimes: both Canadian law and ICC jurisprudence require specific intention to 
assist, where the ad hoc tribunals require the only accused have had knowledge that 
his or her conduct will assist a specific crime.101 However, this does prevent 
reconciliation: the similar mens rea requirements outlined in the Rome Statute and 
Canadian domestic law lend to an interpretation of Canadian law regarding party 
liability in harmony with the Rome Statute, if not with international customary law 
as interpreted by the tribunals. This fits seamlessly with Canada’s dualist approach 
 
96 Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 34(2). See also LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, ibid at 982. On 
the applicability of Section 21 to Federal Statutes, see e.g., Nagalingam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2009] FCR 52 292 DLR (4th) 463 at para 67. With respect to the CAHWCA the Federal Court 
of Appeal was unambiguous in its conclusion that complicity was contemplated by the Act in the case of 
Zazai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 303, 4 FCR D-23 (though the conclusion 
was not based on the applicability of the Interpretation Act). This was solidified by the court most recently, and 
in the criminal law context, in R c Jacques Mungwarere, 2013 ONCS 4594, OJ No 6123 (QL) at paras 48-51 
[Mungwarere].  
97 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 985. 
98 Thatcher, supra note 79 at para 690. See also, Lafontaine, ibid at 986. 
99 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, ibid at 986. 
100 The ad hoc tribunals require a “substantial effect” on the crime. See Kvočka Judgment, supra note 33 at 
para 98. See also Tadić Judgment, supra note 18 at para 229. In Canada however, and likely per Article 25(3) 
of the ICC, the gravity of the effect of the act on the commission of the crime is likely irrelevant.  
101 LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 988-991.  
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to international law, as recognition of the Rome Statute has been formally 
recognized through the ratification of the CAHWCA. Whether a finding of party 
liability is morally sufficient when determining the criminal liability of high-
ranking perpetrators, however, is a question Canadian courts will be left to 
grapple with.  
The third type of party liability provided under section 21 of the Code, 
“common purpose” liability, poses additional challenges. Both the ad hoc 
tribunals – through JCE III – and the ICC allow for vicarious liability. While not 
explicitly outlined in the Rome Statute, Article 25(3) contemplates “a residual” form 
of liability for crimes of a group acting with a common purpose.102 However, 
there are three key differences between this and party liability per section 21:  
(1) Section 21(2) only applies to additional offences which were not agreed to 
between the participants in the joint enterprise. Thus, subsection 21(2) 
cannot serve to capture enterprises the ad hoc tribunals would identify as 
JCE I or II.103  
(2) The requirement of a common illegal design is more stringent in Canadian 
law than it is under the international joint criminal enterprise doctrine.104 
While in international law the design can materialize extemporaneously, in 
Canada the jurisprudential interpretation seems to require formulation of the 
common purpose before the commission of the crime.105 
(3) Subsection 21(2) requires to or more persons form an intention “in common” 
to carry out an unlawful purpose. This requirement, when considered in 
conjunction with the necessity that parties have the intention to mutually 
assist each other in the commission in the offence, implies the participants in 
the enterprise must be identifiable and must include the actual perpetrators. 
This requirement essentially shields leaders of organizations, who are remote 
 
102 Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 54 at para 320. 
103  R v Simpson, [1988] 1 SCR 315, CanLII 15039 (NSSC) at para 14: “the unlawful purpose mentioned in s. 
21(2) must be different from the offence which is actually charged.”  
104 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 999. 
105 While the temporal element of the common purpose is not fully settled in Canadian jurisprudence, Fannie 
LaFontaine aptly notes that the wording of the provision which, in French, imposes the existence of a 
“projet”, as well as some judicial interpretations, seem to indicate a need for the criminal purpose to have 
been formed prior to the commission of the crime. See LaFontaine, Principle Liability Analysis, ibid at 999. 
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from the principal.106 This is far more stringent than the international liability 
doctrines, which were designed to assign liability to these exact individuals.  
The “common purpose” doctrine is thus far more stringent than the various 
international modes of vicarious liability. JCE III or a broad interpretation of 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute are seemingly irreconcilable with the domestic 
context – a logical byproduct of the purposes of the “mononuclear” paradigm 
and the opposing purposes of domestic and international criminal law. 
Finally, it should be noted that CAHWCA crimes are included in the 
category of domestic crimes afforded a special degree of mens rea due to the social 
stigma surrounding them.107 For these offences subjective mens rea will be required 
as a principle of fundamental justice. Per the Supreme Court’s decision in R v 
Logan, “when the principles of fundamental justice required subjective foresight to 
convict a principal…that same minimum degree of mens rea is constitutionally 
required to convict a party to the offence.”108 Thus, the objective elements of 
section 21 are unconstitutional in relation to CAHWCA crimes; the establishment 
of a subjective version of the requisite mens rea for a given offence (i.e. recklessness 
in the case of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and knowledge for the 
specific-intent crime of genocide) is necessary for either principal or party liability 
to arise under section 21.109  
When considered in conjunction with these constitutional protections, the 
extended liability outlined in subsection 21(2) may serve to cover situations akin 
to those of vicarious liability used by the international criminal institutions.110 
 
106 Ibid at 1000. 
107 Finta, supra note 12. Interestingly, LaFontaine notes that the “essence of the justification given by the 
majority in Finta to require subjective mens rea has lost its relevance in Canadian law following the coming 
into force of the CAHWCA and the reformulation of the applicable law by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Mugesera.” See Ibid, at 1001, n. 141. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are now criminalized 
as such under Canadian law and there is no justification for any “further measure of blameworthiness .” 
However, as LaFontaine goes on to note, there is little doubt that the gravity and stigma attached to the 
crimes, as well as the severity of the related sentences, would justify similar conclusions to those reached by 
the court in Finta regarding the minimum constitutional requirement. For a post-CAHWCA example of this 
reasoning see, Mugesera, supra note 74 at para. 176. 
108 R v Logan, 1990 2 SCR 731 at para 24.  
109 For a more extensive discussion on the requisite mens rea for the specific crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes based on the language of the CAHWCA (i.e. recklessness vs. 
knowledge/specific-intent) see LaFontaine, Principal Liability, supra note 63 at 1001-1007. 
110 For the application of s. 21 in the Canadian criminal context re. the CAHWCA see Mungwarere, supra note 
106 at paras 52-55, referring to Pickton, supra note 90 at para 6. It should be noted that the court in 
Mungwarere held the term “real help” used in Pickton could be equated to the term “largely facilitated the 
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However, the scope of its applicability is undoubtedly narrower: the recognition 
of the collective nature of the core crimes pursuant to the common purpose 
doctrine applies only to additional offences that may have been committed as a 
probable consequence of the criminal design formed before the commission of 
the crime in question.111  
THE DANGERS OF INTERNATIONAL MODES OF LIABILITY 
AND THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT: HAMDAN V RUMSFELD 
Up until now, this paper has dealt with the theoretical problem of applying 
the modes of liability of international criminal law [“ICL”] in the domestic 
context. This section aims to ground this theoretical analysis in practical 
examples. Recent developments in American terrorism prosecutions highlight the 
practical implications of applying ICL liability outside of the narrow confines of 
the international tribunals, and the tangible consequences that follow.112  
In 2003, the U.S. commenced its first prosecutions against Guantanamo 
detainees. Rather than trying them before Federal courts, the U.S. elected to 
pursue the prosecutions of Salim Ahmed Hamdan – Osama Bin Laden’s driver – 
and Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul before Military Commissions (MC’s) 
for violations of the laws of war. Both indictments stemmed from the Military 
Commission Act (MCA) of 2006, which codified thirty-two offences, deemed 
triable by MCs.113 Both men appealed to the Court of Military Commission 
Review (CMCR) and, subsequently, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, contending 
 
crime”, used by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kvočka IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment (2 November 
2001), This is emblematic of the direct attempt to incorporate international modes of liability into domestic 
law.  
111 Lafontaine, Principal Liability, supra note 63 at 1008. 
112 While this analysis focuses on the JCE mode of liability (as opposed to command theory/co-
perpetration), given the analysis in previous sections of this paper, particularly the finding that a broad 
interpretation of Article 25(3) allows for vicarious liability (see pg. 20), it seems logical that the arguments 
would naturally extend to the ICC model. Further, it should be noted here that the U.S. is not bound by the 
Rome Statute; the use of an American case here is solely as an illustrative tool to highlight the dangers and 
challenges of the wholesale domestic importation of modes of liability designed for the international criminal 
context. The post-9/11 U.S. context serves as a particularly good example for this analysis.  
113 The details of the prosecution’s, including the basis for prosecution under the Congressional power to 
“define and punish” and the Military Commission Act of 2006, while incredibly interesting, is outside the 
scope of this paper. For an intricate analysis of the manner in which these prosecutions were justified see: 
Alexandra Link, “Trying Terrorism: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Material Support, and the Paradox of 
International Criminal Law” 34 Michigan J of Intl L 2 (2013) 439-490 [“Link, Trying Terrorism”]. 
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that, irrespective of the new provisions in the MCA, both of the “effectively 
inchoate offences” (conspiracy and material support for terrorism) were not 
violations of the customary international laws of war, and thus that the MCs thus 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented by the appeals – whether 
a recognized criminal’s associates may be tried for war crimes on the theory that 
his actions contributed to the crimes – brings to the fore the need to reconcile 
international liability models and domestic legal regimes.114  
Since neither the CMCR’s statute nor any judgment explicitly recognizes any 
inchoate offence for war crimes, U.S. courts have sought recourse in analogy to 
the JCE mode of liability.115 This confluence in the Al Bahlul and Hamdan cases 
analogizes the terrorist organization to the “criminal enterprise” and the 
provision of material support to the “contribution to the enterprise.”116 This 
analogy overlooks decisive differences in the mens rea and causation requirements 
under U.S. law for the relevant crimes.117 
As outlined above, for JCE I, the prosecution must identify the criminal 
object of the common plan and prove that all members of the JCE shared the 
intent to bring about this common criminal goal.118 The basis for individual 
liability is thus intent, not knowledge. The charge of material support for a 
terrorist act, however, does not require a shared intent but only that the accused 
provided support with knowledge that the support would be used to commit the 
underlying crime. The fact that there is no requirement that the support be in 
furtherance of a particular act is antithetical to JCE liability, which requires 
support in furtherance of a specific common end.119  
Additionally, the analogizing of membership in a terrorist organization with 
participation in a JCE essentially means that “membership” is conflated with 
 
114 Ibid at 145. 
115 Ibid at 456. In Al Bahlul, the CMCR Panel specified that: “Assuming that [the charges alleged are 
violations of the law of war] and that “joint criminal enterprise” is a theory of individual criminal liability 
under the law of armed conflict, what, if any, impact does the “joint criminal enterprise” theory of individual 
criminal liability have on this Court’s determinations of whether [the charges] constitute offences triable by 
military commission…” United States v Al Bahlul, 820 F Supp 2d 1141 at 1158 n 11 (CMCR 2011) (en banc), 
rev’d No. 11-1324 (DC Cir 25 Jan 2013) (per curiam).  
116 Link, Trying Terrorism, supra note 113 at 469. 
117 Ibid. 
118 See also Gibson, supra note 33 at 526-527. See also Brđanin Case, supra note 41.  
119 Link, Trying Terrorism, supra note 113 at 469. 
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“shared intent”: a clearly problematic conflation. Mere membership does not 
amount to shared intent toward a particular crime. Further as membership in this 
case is established by government “listing”, an element of the crime is established 
by government designation as opposed to through the evidentiary burden of a 
criminal trial.120 Thus, a finding of individual criminal liability for the crimes of 
an organization based on this “membership” is one in which the charge takes as 
a predicate one of the key elements of the offence. The label “terrorist 
organization” obviates the need for the prosecution to actually prove shared 
criminal intent or link the accused’s mental state to the specific crime. In contrast, 
per the international jurisprudence, a JCE must be defined by its temporal and 
geographic scope, the plurality of participants, and its common criminal 
objective.121 In obviating these requirements it is unclear how domestic courts 
can determine if a crime was within the scope of a JCE, and, thus, which JCE 
model, and which mens rea standard, applies.122  
The problems with conflation of mens rea requirements bring to the fore a 
primary problem with material supports actus reus requirements: a JCE is not an 
entity that can be “joined.” Membership in a JCE amounts to no more than 
shared intent; this is irrelevant to membership in a terrorist organization.123 While 
the concept of “joining” in domestic criminal law thus refers to the actus reus (i.e. 
through the giving of bayat or acting as a driver), “joining” a JCE goes to 
establishing the mens rea, it is irrelevant to the actus reus.124 This is anathema to the 
concept of JCE, where the purpose of membership in the particular group is to 
bring about said harm. 
While an abstraction from the broader purpose of this paper – i.e. to address 
the threat to Canada in losing legitimacy on the international stage by being seen 
as failing to comply with international criminal law – the Hamdan case illustrates 
a broader concern that is directly relevant to the Canadian context. The 
international modes of liability are doctrines designed to serve a body of law 
whose purpose is to provide accountability and justice to societies devastated by 
 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid at 469-470. See also Brđanin Case, supra note 41 at 430. 
122 Link, Trying Terrorism, ibid at 470.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid. 
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mass atrocity.125 As noted in section IV of this paper, it responds to crimes that 
are collective by nature, attempting to imbue individual criminal liability for 
collective action, where the theories of domestic criminal liability often prove 
insufficient. The purpose of these theories of liability is to expand liability’s reach 
up, not down, the chain of culpability;126 any move to import these theories into 
the mononuclear domestic context must bear this in mind.127 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS VERSUS NATIONAL RIGHTS: 
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE 
INDICTMENT OF CANADIANS AT THE ICC 
Previously a matter of abstract theoretical debate, the normative 
quadrangulation discussed throughout this paper is rendered concrete by the 
cases of Hamdan, Al Bahlul, and other detainees whose futures appear to rely on 
the substantive and authoritative limitations placed on the domestic importation 
of international modes of liability.128 These effects are not felt exclusively by 
American detainees. On 20 November 2017 the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou 
Bensouda, “requested authorization … to initiate an investigation into alleged war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the armed conflict in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan since 1 May 2003,” as well as similar crimes that have a 
nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan occurring after 1 July 2002. 129  
Given Canada’s role in the Afghan conflict, it is possible – if not probable 
– that certain Canadians may face international indictment.130 
Herein lies the danger of importation of international modes of liability into 
the Canadian context. As Professor Fannie LaFontaine describes in her work on 
the subject,  
Differences between the two sets of principles [domestic and 
international] or gaps in either, could potentially lead to 
 
125 Ibid at 490. 
126 Ibid at 490.  
127 See e.g., concerns raised in Ezokola, supra note 75. 
128 Link, Trying Terrorism, supra note 113 at 445.  
129 See Preliminary Examination, supra note 1.  
130 For more information on potential Canadian liability see: Craig Scott, Afghanistan Brief, supra note 1.  
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admissibility issues before the ICC, or at least create 
inconsistency in the scope of responsibility for the same crimes, 
depending on whether they are prosecuted in Canadian courts, 
or before the ICC or other international jurisdictions. For 
instance, if Canadian law was found not to contemplate a 
principle of liability encompassed by the Rome Statute, or to 
provide for one more limited in scope, Canada could find itself 
unable to prosecute in its domestic courts a person who would 
be punishable by the ICC for the same acts, thereby opening the 
door to a finding of admissibility of the case before the 
international body.131 
If Canada proves unable to close these “gaps”, then, subject to the principle 
of complementarity, Canadians can be subject to ICC jurisdiction. The 
“theoretical” problem of reconciling these international modes of liability with 
the domestic context are thus far from theoretical – applying ICL sources to find 
criminal liability on international models outside of the narrow confines of the 
international criminal justice bodies has deeply practical implications.  
CONCLUSION 
In light of the principles developed in international criminal law with respect 
to individual responsibility – particularly the modes of liability developed by the 
international criminal courts and tribunals – this paper has aimed to assess 
whether and how Canadian law may be adapted to the particular “collective” 
nature of international crimes.  
A gap in the net cast by the Canadian legal regime may be anticipated in 
cases where the contribution of the accused – mostly leaders but also mid-range 
perpetrators – will be more difficult to link to the elements of a particular crime. 
Their role may be essential for the realization of the common criminal plan but 
may be more difficult to link to the actus reus of the crime itself. The limited 
recognition of the reality of collective criminality in the domestic criminal system 
may impact the “perceived gravity” of certain conduct and on the attached 
sentences: as the actus reus requirements may restrict findings of liability to party 
 
131 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, supra note 63 at 971-972.  
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(as opposed to principal) liability, the “indirect perpetrator” may be perceived as 
less culpable, may have access to defences not available to principals, and may be 
generally subject to less stringent punishments/a less stringent legal regime than 
those found principally liable.132  
The purpose of this paper has been to assess whether and how Canadian 
principles of liability can reflect the realities of international crimes, while staying 
true to the canons of domestic law. While the CAHWCA forces Canadian 
criminal law to evolve and move away from the mononuclear paradigm of 
criminal law, barriers to the reconciliation of domestic and international criminal 
law remain in place Canada’s global position has long been as a “soft-power” 
player; Canadian participation in the international criminal justice project was, and 
still is, emblematic of this role. Should Canada wish to maintain the legitimacy 
that stems from this role, Canadian law must adapt to the reality of international 
crimes. A failure to achieve both legal and normative quadrangulation with 
international modes of liability could mean the evasion of criminal liability by 
alleged war criminals, or the perception that such liability is evaded. Differences 
between the two sets of legal or normative principles, or gaps in either, could lead 
to the admissibility of issues before the ICC.133 Either could be devastating to 
Canadian legitimacy in the international criminal law project. Whether such 
quadrangulation is done through principal or secondary liability is a decision for 
domestic lawmakers – it is frankly irrelevant to the assumption of jurisdiction 
based on complementarity. As this paper has shown, there is still much to do in 
terms of legal and normative quadrangulation; recognizing this acute gap, 
however, is the beginning of this exercise. 
 
132 LaFontaine, Principal Liability Analysis, ibid at 1009-1010.  
133 Ibid.  
